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ICC INABILITY DETERMINATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE DUJAIL CASE
Gregory S. McNeal*
The Court will really have to invent, create and define the meaning of a
state that is unable or unwilling to conduct "genuine" proceedings.
Phillipe Kirsch'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the principle of complementarity, the International Criminal
Court (ICC) will only exercise jurisdiction when a state is "unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution" of alleged
criminals. Unfortunately, "unable" is largely undefined. Article 17(3) of the
ICC statute provides a skeletal definition, stating "[t]o determine inability in
a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substan-
tial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is un-
able to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or oth-
erwise unable to carry out its proceedings."2 This definition raises as many
questions as it answers.
The Dujail case of the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) presents an inter-
esting test case for analyzing the principle of complementarity. Using the
IHT as a case study is important because the Tribunal will likely serve as
the model for future internationalized domestic tribunals. Thus, assuming
arguendo that Iraq was a signatory to the ICC, would the IHT and Iraq's
criminal justice system have met the standards precluding the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction? Under ICC jurisprudence, what constitutes "un-
able"? Did the procedural shortcomings and other failures of the Duj ail case
rise to the requisite level of inability?
* Gregory S. McNeal is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the Pennsylvania State
University, Dickinson School of Law. He is co-editor of the book Saddam On Trial: Under-
standing and Debating the Iraqi High Tribunal. The author would like to extend special
thanks to Rebecca Slazinski for her tireless research assistance and Professor Kevin Jon
Heller for his insightful comments and suggestions. Of course, any errors or omissions are
solely the responsibility of the author.
1 Phillipe Kirsch, President, Int'l Criminal Court, The International Criminal Court, re-
marks John Tait Memorial Lecture in Law and Policy (Oct. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.canada-justice.org/en/dept/pub/tait/kirschlecture.html (discussing the meaning
of "unable or unwilling" articulated in Article 17 of the Rome Statute).
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17(3), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
999, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_120704-
EN.pdf.
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In Part One, I consider the ICC standard for "unable." I discuss the
definition of "unable" as provided by ICC Statute Article 17. I examine the
ambiguity of the term, and outline the ICC procedures for determining in-
ability. I detail the due process thesis and textualist approaches to inability
determinations, and explain the expanded ability criteria developed by the
ICC and the ICC's migration towards the due process thesis.
In Part Two, I apply the inability approaches detailed in Part One to
the IHT. I begin by addressing the significance of the IHT and the criticisms
of the IHT by various non-governmental organizations (NGOs). I then apply
each of the inability approaches to the IHT fact pattern and the criticism
leveled by the NGOs. I conclude this section by determining whether the
IHT could be deemed "unable" under each test. I conclude the article by
discussing the implications of these questions for the ICC and for domesti-
cally constituted tribunals. I recommend that the ICC determine clear-cut
criteria for inability determinations, as this will promote domestic tribunals
and placate some ICC critics.
II. ICC ARTICLE 17 "UNABLE"?
Inability is a prime feature of the ICC's complementarity regime.
Unfortunately, the concept is largely undefined and subject to varied inter-
pretations. The ICC Statute, written to defer to the jurisdiction of domestic
courts, establishes seemingly straightforward conditions for determining
whether the ICC will hear a case on inability grounds. 3 Nations are pre-
sumed capable to prosecute cases; for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, the
ICC Prosecutor must demonstrate that the state was unable to effectively
pursue domestic prosecution.4 Specifically, Article 17(3) of the ICC Statute
states that "[t]o determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall con-
sider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its
national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the nec-
essary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceed-
ings."5 Broadly speaking, complementarity is meant to ensure that the ICC
only exercises jurisdiction over cases where the domestic judicial system
does not investigate or prosecute the crime. In the case of inability, com-
plementarity is designed to ensure that the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction
if a state is able to investigate and prosecute a crime. States are generally
3 William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal
Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L LAW, 557, 575 (2005).
4 Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Imple-
ment International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 899 (2002).
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17(3), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M.




afforded the opportunity to address criminal wrongdoing, and with good
reason. "[T]here are substantial arguments that the fullest cathartic impact
of the prosecutorial approach to war crimes occurs when the responsible
population itself comes to grips with its past and administers appropriate
justice."6 United States Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, an
outspoken ICC critic, commented on complementarity, and the benefits of
ensuring local justice stating:
It is within national judicial systems where the international effort should
be to encourage the warring parties to resolve questions of criminality as
part of a comprehensive solution to their disagreements. Removing key
elements of the dispute to a distant forum, especially the emotional and
contentious issues of war crimes and crimes against humanity, undercuts
the very progress that these peoples, victims and perpetrators alike, must
make if they are ever to live peacefully together.7
However, as Article 17(3) makes clear, when domestic systems fail and are
unable to prosecute criminals, the ICC may assert jurisdiction. A state's
failure to act may be a result of
poor administration of justice, or a breakdown of State institutions, such as
the national judicial system, or of widespread anarchy. The State must be
unable to obtain an accused or key evidence and testimony, and its inabil-
ity must relate to the total, substantial collapse, or unavailability of its ju-
dicial system.8
Article 17(3), articulates this "unwilling or unable" test and ad-
dresses the "failed state" scenario in which a "State's legal and administra-
tive structures have completely broken down."9 However, some argue that
Article 17 covers circumstances where states are unable to conduct trials
meeting international human rights standards.
A. Ambiguity of Inability Terminology
Inability is an ambiguous term, and even members of the court have
admitted that the jurisdictional authority stemming from the "unable" term
remains unclear. In an address to the Canadian Department of Justice,
President of the ICC Phillipe Kirsch explained that, when it comes to the
principle of complementarity "[t]he Court will really have to invent, create
and define the meaning of a state that is unable or unwilling to conduct
6 John R. Bolton, Remarks to the Federalist Soc'y: The United States and the Intema-
tional Criminal Court, (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm.
7 Id.
S El Zeidy, supra note 3, at 903.
9 Katherine L. Doherty & Timothy L.H. McCormack, "Complementarity"for Compre-
hensive Domestic Penal Legislation, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 152 (1999).
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'genuine' proceedings."' 0 If the provision must be left to the court's judges
to "invent" and "create," it certainly lacks clarity and is subject to varying
defimitions.
The most popular definition is the one cited by the ICC's website,
stating that "[a] country may be 'unable' when its legal system has col-
lapsed."" Others contend that:
[t]he criteria for inability are clearly provided in Article 17(3) in [an] ob-
jective way. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court
shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailabil-
ity of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused
or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out
its proceedings.
While this definition may be objective it is far from clear, particu-
larly because no established definition for the term "collapsed" exists. Ac-
cording to one scholar, collapsed refers to a legal system that is "insuffi-
ciently organized to gather evidence or is 'otherwise unable to carry out its
proceedings.'"12 Another states that "[i]nability is confined to a total or par-
tial collapse of the criminal justice system of the State concerned,"'13 adding
more complexity to the terminology by introducing the term "partial col-
lapse." A third believes that inability or collapse refers "primarily to situa-
tions in which there is a lack of central government or a state of chaos due
to conflict or crisis."' 4 None of these proposed definitions shed much light
on what inability means, rather they simply restate what's already in Article
17. This reinforces the point that the actual content and operation of "un-
able" is still unclear.
B. ICC Procedures for Determining Inability
Some uncertainty exists as to the actual procedure to be followed to
assess inability. For the ICC to determine that a state is "unable," it would
have to determine that the tate's "ability to administer justice is" in ques-
1o Kirsch, supra note 1.
11 See Int'l Criminal Court, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/
ataglance/faq.html (last visited May 17, 2007).
12 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Interactions Between National and International Criminal Law
in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 2, at 5-6 (2006) (citing
I.C.C. Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues, Sept. 2003, at 4).
13 Johan D. van der Vyver, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, FREDERICK K.
Cox INT'L LAW CENTER RESEARCH PORTAL, Sept. 23, 2003, http://law.case.edu/war-crimes-
research-portal/instant-analysis.asp?id=5.
14 Delmas-Marty, supra note 11, at 5-6.
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tion.15 This assessment would require a determination that "the state lacks
effective mechanisms to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and
testimony; or that it is otherwise unable to carry out proceedings."' 6 Accord-
ing to an official ICC policy paper, the provision on inability to investigate
or prosecute "was inserted to take account of situations where there was a
lack of central government, or a state of chaos due to the conflict or crisis,
or public disorder leading to collapse of national systems ....
According to an informal ICC paper, 18 the inability assessment first
considers "collapse" or "unavailability" of the national judicial system, and
then the state's ability to obtain the accused or the evidence and testimony.' 9
Article 17 includes a catchall clause which raises for consideration whether
a state is "otherwise unable to carry out proceedings." The factors to con-
sider when determining "inability" include the:
" lack of necessary personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor [sic];
" lack of judicial infrastructure;
" lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation rendering system "un-
available";
" lack of access rendering system "unavailable";
" obstruction by uncontrolled elements rendering system "unavailable";
" amnesties, immunities rendering system "unavailable."
20
While the informal paper set forth seemingly objective criteria, the addition
of further factors to consider increases the ambiguity of the process. The
ICC has presented no paper or guidance indicating what weight will be at-
tributed to the criteria outlined above. For example, if a tribunal has an ade-
quate number of judges, investigators and prosecutors but lacks an appro-
priate number of personnel in its outreach office, is the tribunal thus "un-
able." Or must all of the inability factors be met for a tribunal to be deemed
"unable." The ICC has provided very little guidance beyond the informal
paper, which is the only substantive examination of possible inability con-
siderations. This ambiguity and lack of consensus has resulted in expansive
15 Sarah Sewall & Carl Kaysen, The United States and the International Criminal Court:
The Choices Ahead, AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCi., (2002), http://www.amacad.org/projects/
iccarticle.aspx.
16 MARIANA PENA, AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT.,
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 2 (2005), available at http://www.amicc.org/
docs/Complementarity.pdf.
17 THE AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COALTION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY n.5 (2005).
18 INT'L CRIM. CT. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE
OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE (2003) [hereinafter INFORMAL PAPER], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf.
19 Id. at 15 (suggesting criteria for "inablility").
20 Id. at 31.
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notions of inability and has prompted some advocates to urge an expansive
definition of ICC jurisdiction.
C. Lack of Consensus Yields Expansive Notions of Inability
1. Due Process Thesis
It is clear that the ICC informal paper attempted to define inability.
However, this resulted in the addition of several more factors of considera-
tion, factors which vary from the definitions of inability set forth by other
experts, court officials, and even official court documents. Absent a clear
definition of "unable," states do not know the current scope of the ICC's
jurisdiction or how far it may expand. Many scholars have sought to fill the
void with an aspirational vision of the ICC's jurisdiction. These scholars
state that inability refers to the lack of substantive law or the existing legis-
lation which does not meet the standards of recognized international human
rights. Professor Kevin Jon Heller described this theory as the "due process
thesis.",21 This "due process thesis" presents a clear possibility of expanded
ICC jurisdiction.
The "due process thesis" asserts that the jurisdiction of the ICC may
extend to any nation which cannot conduct a trial meeting international
standards of "due process." For example, as Mark Ellis and others state: "If
[s]tates desire to retain control over prosecuting nationals charged with
crimes under the ICC Statute, they must ensure that their own judicial sys-
tems meet international standards. At a minimum, states will have to adhere
to standards of due process found in international human rights instruments,
particularly as they relate to the rights of defendants. 22
21 Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the
Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255, 256-57 (2006).
22 Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law
and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215, 241 (2002); see also Darryl Robin-
son, The Rome Statute and Its Impact on National Law, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1849, 1866 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002) ("It is expected that the ICC will show considerable deference to national procedural
approaches. Thus, most States will be relying on their usual criminal procedures, provided
that those procedures are effective and respect basic human rights standards."); Albin Eser,
For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism, 39 TULSA L. REv. 955, 960
(2004) ("I have sincere doubts whether the Rome Statute may fairly be interpreted as inten-
tionally sacrificing the rights of the accused for preventing impunity at any cost .... ") (cita-
tion omitted); Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation
of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 86, 112 ("[T]he legality
and legitimacy of implementation require States to pay due consideration to... the rights of
due process .... ").
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2. The Textualist Approach
While most scholars subscribe to the "due process thesis, '23 Profes-
sor Heller,follows what I deem a textualist approach, more faithful to the
language of the ICC Statute. Heller states that "article 17's text, context,
purpose, and history-the basic principles of treaty interpretation-all
clearly indicate that a State's failure to guarantee a defendant due process is
not currently a ground for admissibility." When the ICC reads the provi-
sions of Article 17 regarding the meaning of "unable," Heller questions
whether the court must also consider the prior language and development of
the unwilling provisions.24 By critically analyzing the drafting history and
specific language of the ICC Statute relating to the unwillingness determi-
nation, he concludes that the due process thesis is wholly ruled out both by
the text and by the drafting history of Article 17. Once a state begins to
conduct a prosecution, the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over a case if
it finds that the state's substantive law deficiencies benefit the defendant,
that is to say those deficiencies make it easier for the alleged perpetrator to
evade justice.2 5 He refers to this conclusion as the "'shadow side' of com-
plementarity.
' 26
Through this textualist approach, Heller addresses the "due process
thesis" as it relates to inability. Heller states that one would not "ordinarily
describe a functioning national judicial system that lacks certain due process
protections as one that has 'collapsed' or become 'unavailable.' 27 In fact,
he points out that "the ordinary meaning of those terms-and 'inability'
generally-seems to embrace only (relatively) objective criteria such as a
political situation that makes holding trials impossible or a debilitating lack
of judges, prosecutors, and other court personnel., 2 8 In assessing these crite-
ria Heller flatly concludes that the only type of inability that could satisfy
Article 17(3) is that which "prevents a State from effectively investigating
or prosecuting the accused. Collapse or unavailability that prevents the State
from fairly investigating or prosecuting ... doesn't qualify. '29 However he
leaves open the possibility that textual ambiguity in article 17(3), "regarding
23 Heller, supra note 21, at 256-57.
24 See id. at 271-73. Article 17 of the ICC Statute states that a case is inadmissible when
"[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it,
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecu-
tion." ICC Statute, supra note 4, at art. 17, (1)(a) (emphasis added).
25 See Heller, supra note 21, at 273.
26 Id. at 273.
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the paragraph's 'otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings' language"
may allow the due process thesis to prevail.3°
3. ICC Migration toward "Due Process Thesis"
Despite the Professor Heller's well-reasoned analysis, the ICC has
seemingly subscribed to the due process thesis, ignoring the lack of specific
textual support for this approach in the ICC statute.3 The Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur illustrates this point.32 The commission
considered whether Sudan was "unable and unwilling to prosecute and try
the alleged offenders. 33 The report explains the legal meaning of the prin-
ciple of complementarity, 4 and provides six reasons to refer the situation to
the ICC, two of which are relevant to this discussion of inability, and in-
structive regarding the ICC's analysis of inability.35 The commission's rea-
sons for a referral to the ICC included "the fair trial guarantees offered by
the international composition of the Court and by its rules of procedure and
evidence; the ability to intervene immediately; and finally the lack of 'sig-
nificant financial burden' to the international community. 36
The first of these conclusions suggests that the commission sub-
scribes to the due process thesis. Due process thesis proponents specifically
look to fair trial guarantees in determining whether a state is able to conduct
a trial, and the commission report highlights the same concerns, preferring
the ICC for its "fair trial guarantees" and "its rules of procedure and evi-
dence. 37
The second conclusion of the commission addresses the court's
ability to act quickly, suggesting that unnecessary delays are an acceptable
criterion for ICC referral determinations. Such a conclusion may have been
designed to ensure that the commission's recommendations were not inter-
preted to support an ad hoc tribunal such as the Yugoslavia or Rwanda tri-
30 Id. But, Heller makes clear that this possibility is foreclosed by the textual history of
Article 17.
31 See id. at 260-77 (addressing the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in
terms of willingness and genuineness, but not on ability grounds).
32 Delmas-Marty, supra note 11 (citing The Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,
9 574, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005) available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/
darfur.htm; see also Symposia, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539, 539-607 (2005)).
33 The Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary-
General, 99 568, 586, 627, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Darfur Com-
mission Report], available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/darfur.htm.
34 Id. 99 606-09.
" Id. 9648.
36 Delmas-Marty, supra note 11, at 5-6.
31 Id. at 5-6.
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bunals, which take years to build, staff, and begin hearing cases.3 8 However,
given the ICC's permanency, it is difficult to imagine any post-conflict cir-
cumstance where the ICC would not have an advantage over a domestically
constituted tribunal when measured in terms of its "ability to act quickly." A
pre-existing court will always be able to act more quickly than a post-
conflict nation could establish a court and commence proceedings.
4. Implications of the "Due Process Thesis" For Inability Determina-
tions
The due process thesis represents an expansion of the principles of
complementarity beyond those contemplated during the ICC Statute draft-
ing, at least with respect to the ability of a tribunal to provide "fair trial
guarantees," "rules of procedure and evidence," and swift justice on par
with ICC standards. 39 During the creation of the ICC Statute, states were
concerned that they might be deemed unable to genuinely carry out pro-
ceedings "simply because of a comparative lack of resources or because of a
lack of full compliance with all human rights standards. ' 4° The central ques-
tion is whether "proceedings are so inadequate that they cannot be consid-
ered 'genuine' proceedings. '41 The "due process thesis" raises serious ques-
tions about the complementarity regime, the role local justice can play in a
state's good faith efforts to provide post-conflict accountability, and the
degree of competency required from such efforts to preclude the ICC from
asserting jurisdiction? ' 42
38 Darfur Commission Report, supra note 32, 574 ("Given that international action is
urgently needed, one might consider opportune to establish an ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunal, as was the case for previous armed conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia
and in Rwanda, when the ICC did not exist yet. However, at least two considerations militate
against such a solution. First, these Tribunals, however meritorious, are very expensive.
Secondly, at least so far, on a number of grounds they have been rather slow in the prosecu-
tion and punishment of the indicted persons. It would seem that it is primarily for these rea-
sons that at present no political will appears to exist in the international community to set up
yet another ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal (another major reason being that now a
permanent and fully-fledged international criminal institution is available)."). See also Helen
Cobban, Think Again: International Courts, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 22 (argu-
ing that modern ad hoc tribunals are "prolonged and expensive" and noting that "[als of
November 2005, the ICTR had handed down judgments for only 25 individuals[, and that
m]ore than $1 billion has been spent on the tribunal so far, or about $40 million per judg-
ment").
39 Heller, supra note 21, at 25-26.
40 INFORMAL PAPER, supra note 17, at 8.
41 id.
42 Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2006). "Under the doctrine of complementarity, the ICC
can only exercise jurisdiction where a state is deemed 'unwilling or unable' to investigate or
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The above conclusions can be summarized into a spectrum of in-
ability tests. On one end is the most conservative approach, the textualist
approach. Under this approach, the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction unless
the shortcomings in a tribunal prevent a state from effectively investigating
or prosecuting the accused: inability that prevents the state from fairly in-
vestigating or prosecuting does not qualify.
The middle-and perhaps the most ambiguous-approach is that
articulated in the ICC Informal Paper43 and expanded on in the Darfur
Commission Report. 44 This approach is ambiguous because it introduces a
series of factors lacking precise definitions or weight. Factors to consider
include "collapse" or "unavailability" of the national judicial system, 45 the
state's ability to obtain the accused, or the evidence and testimony,46 an
ambiguous catchall clause considering whether a state is "otherwise unable
to carry out proceedings, ' 47 as well as at least six other facts and evidence
criterion, fair trial guarantees, the state's ability to intervene quickly, and
the financial burden to the international community. In short, this approach
introduces so many criteria that an inability determination may be entirely
discretional.
Finally, the most expansive definition is that advocated by "due
process thesis" proponents. The "due process thesis" asserts that a nation
unable to conduct a trial that meets international standards of "due process"
may fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC; to avoid ICC jurisdiction, states
will have to adhere to standards of due process found in international human
rights instruments, especially those related to the rights of defendants.48
Scholarly commentary, official court statements, and the Report of
the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur all provide ambiguous criteria for
making inability determinations. However, the trend amongst them suggests
that the court is migrating toward the "due process thesis." As will be dis-
cussed below, this theory of expanded ICC jurisdiction portends that a na-
tional jurisdiction whose good faith efforts at local justice resulted in a tri-
bunal like the IHT would not retain jurisdiction over its defendants.
prosecute the crime." Id. at 5 n.17 (citing ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 17; WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 66-70 (2001)).
43 INFORMAL PAPER, supra note 17.
44 Darfur Commission Report, supra note 32.
45 INFORMAL PAPER, supra note 17, at 15.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Heller, supra note 21, at 241 (describing the due process thesis).
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HI. THE IHT AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL
A. Significance of the IHT
The Dujail case is an important test for the complementarity regime.
The IHT is the world's first "internationalized domestic tribunal," and is
"likely to serve as a new kind of model for bringing former leaders to jus-
tice throughout the world, which will complement other options such as trial
before the International Criminal Court or before Hybrid International-
Domestic tribunals like the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
' 49
The IHT and the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina are the first of a new breed of domestic tribunals combining
elements of international and domestic war crimes courts.50 Seated in Bagh-
dad with all Iraqi judges, the IHT is independent from the ordinary Iraqi
court system, it is assisted by international advisers, and "its constituent
instruments incorporate the definitions of crimes and due process rights
contained in the statutes of the existing international war crimes tribunals
and stipulate that the precedent of those tribunals are to guide the decisions
of the IHT."5 I
The IHT's procedures, definition of crimes, and standards of due
process will serve as a model for Iraqi courts and other courts in the Middle
East.5 2 "In the future, internationalized domestic tribunals like the IHT may
play an increasingly important role in the growing accountability web for
atrocity crimes, a web which also includes the International Criminal Court,
the Security Council-created ad hoc war crimes tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the UN-created hybrid war crimes tribunals for
Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia, and ordinary national courts.
53
With su.ch high stakes, it is critical to assess whether the IHT meets the
standards of ability necessary to preclude ICC jurisdiction. If so, then other
"internationalized domestic tribunals" can follow the IHT model with con-
fidence; however, if the tribunal does not meet the standard necessary to
preclude jurisdiction, then key lessons can be drawn from the IHT's experi-
ence to improve future "internationalized domestic tribunals."
49 Michael P. Scharf, Is the Saddam Trial One of the Most Important Court Cases of All
Time?, in SADDAM ON TR1AL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL
230 (Michael P. Scharf& Gregory S. McNeal. eds., 2006).
50 Michael P. Scharf, Lessons from the Saddam Trial, in SADDAM ON TRIAL:
UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 232 (Michael P. Scharf & Greg-
ory S. McNeal eds., 2006).
5 Id.
" Id. at 232.
53 Id.
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B. Criticism of the IHT
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Center for Tran-
sitional Justice (ICTJ) criticized the IHT for failing to meet sufficient ad-
ministrative, procedural, and substantive standards to ensure a fair trial,
criticism which I summarize below. 54 The opinions of NGOs such as these
are important because in the past, the ICC has cited to research and reports
of these NGOs as persuasive authority for its decisions,55 has considered
their opinions in developing and planning activities of the court,56 and has
even catalogued their reports on the ICC website as legal tools for research-
ers.5 7 Given the definitional ambiguity I addressed above, questions arise
regarding the circumstances that would allow the ICC to assume jurisdiction
over a case. "[T]he admissibility criteria of the [ICC] Statute provide but a
thin set of guidelines or a skeletal framework for national judiciaries ....
Despite efforts to expand on the criteria developed at Rome, the Statute
leaves much for the Court to specify in early cases testing admissibility.,
58
54 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Dujail Trial Fundamentally Flawed, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS,
Nov. 20, 2006, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/20/iraq14589.htm; Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice, Briefing Paper, Dujail: Trial and Error?, at 11-15
(Nov. 2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/5/9/597.pdf.
55 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Prosecutor, Observations on Issues Concerning the
Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pend-
ing Before the ICC (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-
02-05-14 English.pdf (describing Human Rights Watch reports as "reliable"); see also
Prosecutor's Response to Cassese 's Observation on Issues Concerning the Protection of
Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending before the
ICC (Sept. 11, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-
16_English.pdf (relying on Human Rights Watch observations regarding sustained fighting
in Darfur); Letter of the Prosecutor Regarding the Situation in Iraq (Feb. 9, 2006), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPletter-to-senders re Iraq_9_February_200
6.pdf (citing Human Rights Watch reports regarding factual circumstances), Defence Appeal
Against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 (Oct. 26, 2006), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-620_English.pdf (citing to Human
Rights Watch Report about the arrest of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo).
56 See REPORT ON THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, ICC Fifth Session Assembly of State Parties (Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-30_English.pdf
57 See ICC Website Legal Tools, http://www.icc-cpi.int/legaltools/right.php?p=LkuIE5h
dGlvbmFslGp 1 cmlzZGljdGivbnMvQXVzdHJhbGlhLlJlcG9ydHMgb24gSHVtYW4gUmlna
HRz (last visited May 28, 2007).
58 William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal
Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L., 557, 576 (2005) ("The Pre-trial Chamber will make apply the
complementarity provisions to make determinations of admissibility."); Id. (citing F. Lat-
tanzi, The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 49 (M. Politi & G. Nesi, eds.) (2001) (observing
that "it is always up to the Court to decide on issues of complementarity").
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The possible and perhaps inevitable expansion of ICC jurisdiction beyond
that contemplated by ICC statute signatories leads to my next question: in
the face of the inability tests detailed above and NGO criticism, if Iraq were
an ICC participant, would the IHT have avoided ICC jurisdiction? To ap-
propriately address this question I summarize the fair trial guarantee and
administrative criticism of the IHT. In light of that criticism, I apply the
various inability tests to the IHT, examining the circumstances that would
have counseled in favor of ICC jurisdiction,
1. Fair Trial Guarantees
During and after the Dujail case, the IHT was frequently criticized
for failing to meet internationally accepted fair trial guarantees. 9 The Hu-
man Rights Watch Report concluded that "[t]he court's conduct ... reflects
a basic lack of understanding of fundamental fair trial principles, and how to
uphold them in the conduct of a relatively complex trial. The result is a trial
that did not meet key fair trial standards., 60 The International Center for
Transitional Justice concluded that "[a] retrial may be the most desirable
remedy [for the Dujail trial's shortcomings] as it would allow the Chamber
to seek to correct the procedural flaws as well as the evidentiary gaps-the
trial's two major deficiencies. 61
Human Rights Watch expressed concerns that the investigation and
prosecution in Dujail failed to produce evidence establishing that the high-
level defendants knew or had reason to know that crimes would be commit-
ted as a result of facially legal orders, or in the absence of explicit orders at
all.62 This type of evidence is critical to establishing the political structure,
authorization, and agreement to commit crimes. Human Rights Watch also
criticized the IHT for failing to respect fundamental fair trial rights, listing
all such rights guaranteed by international human rights standards.63 Human
59 See Nehal Bhuta, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL
5 (Human Rights Watch, 2006) [hereinafter HRW Judging], available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2O06/iraq1106/ ("The evolution of the IHT over the past three years
has given rise to serious concerns about its capacity to fairly and effectively try these mas-
sive crimes in a manner that is consistent with international criminal law and fair trial stan-
dards."). See also Op-Ed, Kim Sengupta, Is Saddam Hussein getting a fair trial in Baghdad?
THE INDEPENDENT (London) (Sept. 27, 2006) (discussing how the Dujail trial had descended
into chaos); Editorial, Iraq's Rough Justice, L.A. TIMES, (Nov. 7, 2006) (finding that the
conduct of the Dujail trial had fallen short of American standards ofjustice).
60 HRW Judging, supra note 58.
61 Dujail: Trial & Error, supra note 53, at 16.
62 HRW Judging, supra note 58, at 74.
63 Id. at 36 (listing the human rights guaranteed in trial).
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Rights Watch concluded that these rights "are the minimum requirements
for a trial to be considered 'fair' in international law."64
2. Administrative Shortcomings
The IHT was also subject to frequent criticism for its handling of
administrative issues. Administratively, the IHT is charged with "crucial
responsibilities both inside and outside the courthouse. These include han-
dling the court's documentation... assisting the chambers, prosecutors, and
defense office, forming a victims and witnesses unit, overseeing the deten-
tion of defendants, as well as communicating with the media. ' 65 Human
Rights Watch correctly states that "[c]ompetent administration is essential
for any court to run effectively, but in the case of courts adjudicating multi-
defendant trials concerning large-scale crimes, court administration is the
fulcrum on which the trial pivots. '66 While I have separated fair trial guar-
antees from administrative criticism, as did the NGO reports, the two are
interlinked. Parties cannot effectively conduct a trial without administration
that ensures access to evidence and witnesses, as well as clear motion prac-
tice.
Human Rights Watch asserts that, despite statutory direction, and
despite the clear importance of administrative functions, the IHT has not
created an effective administrative body.67 Human Rights Watch highlights
concerns regarding victims and witness protection, insufficient court docu-
mentation, inadequate security for private defense counsel, security con-
cerns impacting the ability to communicate with the public, and equality of
resources for the fliT defense office.68 According to Human Rights Watch,
court administrative staff complained that they received no training or in-
struction in administrative procedures relevant to trials of this kind,69 while
several judges asserted that the administration of the documentation and
records of court proceedings was so poor that they could not easily deter-
mine which motions and documents they had received.7°
Voicing similar concerns, the ICTJ report stated that "In practice..
the administrative structure outlined in the Tribunal's framing laws has
64 Id. at 37.
65 Dujail: Trial & Error, supra note 53, at 14., "The goal of the unit is to protect anyone at
risk, 'on account of the testimony they give' at the Tribunal, and includes safety measures,
short and long term plans for protection, and medical treatment, counseling and rehabilitative
support." Id. at n. 45 (quoting Article 15 of the [IHT] Rules of Procedure).
66 HRW Judging, supra note 58, at 12.
67 Id. at 88.
68 Id. at 88-89.




failed to function. A critical issue has been a lack of leadership. Administra-
tive directors have been purged and replaced, and the director's duties have
been divided among other IHT officials on an ad hoc basis.71 According to
the ICTJ report, the administrative errors resulted in "concerns that went
beyond inefficiency., 72 Defense counsel complained that "very limited dis-
closure of witness identities (an hour before proceedings) damaged their
ability to confront witnesses. 73 No written transcript was available during
the trial phase, affecting final statements and limiting public understanding
of events. 74 Unless an unedited transcript is subsequently produced, defen-
dants will not have a court transcript on which to base appeals.
75
C. Applying the Inability Tests to IHT Criticism
1. Textualist Approach
Under the textualist approach detailed earlier, the deficiencies in
fair trial guarantees highlighted by Human Rights Watch and the ICTJ
would not have risen to the level necessary to allow the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction. Under the textualist approach, inability preventing a state from
fairly investigating or prosecuting a defendant does not establish jurisdic-
tion. This is Heller's "shadow side" of complementarity, 76 whereby an in-
ability determination is only appropriate when the purported inability ad-
vantages the defendant, potentially shielding him from prosecution. Even
assuming arguendo that all of the HRW and ICTJ assertions were true, the
deficiencies highlighted above, such as a failure to respect human rights
standards or failure to present sufficient evidence to justify a conviction, all
served to make a conviction more likely and therefore under a textualist
approach would not justify jurisdiction premised upon inability.
From a textualist perspective, the administrative criticism presents a
closer inability call than did criticism regarding fair trial guarantees. Fol-
lowing the logic of the textualist test, only an inability determination poten-
tially shielding a defendant from prosecution can qualify. When objectively
measured, some of the administrative and procedural shortcomings of the
IHT posed by Human Rights Watch and the International Center for Transi-
71 Dujail: Trial & Error, supra note 53, at 14. stating "Salem Chalabi, the original Direc-
tor, was replaced in August 2004; his replacement was removed in August 2005; the post has
been vacant since. The tasks of media outreach and establishing a victims and witness pro-




75 Id.; see also id at n.47 (comparing "article 53 of the Rules of Procedure, mandating the
preservation of trial records.").
76 See Heller, supra note 21.
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tional Justice may have favored the defendants. Of course, given the out-
come of the trial they were not dispositive, however they may in the nar-
rowest sense run to the advantage of the defense.
For example, procedures (or the lack thereof) for dealing with
documentation may have created circumstances where key prosecutorial
evidence and motions were lost; depending upon the importance of these
documents, this certainly could benefit the defendant. Moreover, the Human
Rights Watch report points out administrative difficulties were not limited
to support of the defense office, but also included assistance to chambers
and to prosecutors.77 Furthermore, the reports point out that the proceedings
lacked protections for victims and witnesses. 78 This presents a potentially
substantial advantage for the defendants, by increasing the possibility that
opposing witnesses would choose not to testify for fear of reprisals.
Also, the chaotic and sporadic communication with the media, high-
lighted in reports as outreach deficiencies, 79 could present a case for inabil-
ity under a textualist approach. In the Dujail case, the defense conducted
outreach efforts more sophisticated than those of the prosecution, which was
slow to develop a media strategy and to respond to defense comments to the
press.80 This situation was not rectified until halfway through the Dujail
case, when the prosecution entered key documentary evidence against the
defendants and went to the media to explain the significance of the evi-
dence.81 Such inability benefited the defendants: while it may not have
shielded them from justice, it may have marginally increased the likelihood
of an acquittal.
Overall, under a textualist approach it is unlikely that the ICC
would exercise jurisdiction over the IHT and its defendants. While there
were some flaws, very few of those flaws helped the defendants. If any-
thing, most criticism alleged that the tribunal was a show trial, aimed at
77 HRW Judging, supra note 58.
78 Id. See also Dujail: Trial and Error, supra note 53.
79 HRW Judging, supra note 58; Dujail: Trial and Error, supra note 53.
80 See Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Archived Webcast, Lessons fiom the
Saddam Trial, Saddam Onstage: Assessing the Media Coverage of the Trial, Opening Com-
ments of Gregory S. McNeal, http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20061006&
type-rn&a=4 (noting that "buffoonery" often overshadowed the evidence in the Dujail trial
since "the prosecution wasn't necessarily doing as much [media] outreach as it could have"
in the case).
81 See id. (noting a shift in media coverage when the prosecution presented this documen-
tary evidence to the tribunal and to the media); See also Saddam on Trial, Comments of




securing a conviction of the defendants,82 an unfortunate "shadow side' 83 of
the complementarity regime, but not one that would justify ICC jurisdiction.
2. ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Report Approach
The ICC Informal Paper and the Darfur Commission Report each
provide a series of elements and factors to consider when making an inabil-
ity determination. Because these factors overlap and complement one an-
other, I have combined them into a series of tests detailed below represent-
ing a middle approach between the textualist approach and the due process
theorist approach. However, as was highlighted above, this approach ap-
pears to be migrating towards the due process theorist approach.
8 4
The approach of the ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission
Report considers a series of elements that are somewhat ambiguous and
oftentimes contradictory. The first of these elements is the "collapse" or
"unavailability" of the national judicial system. Applying this test to the
IHT, this criterion is clearly not satisfied; it would be difficult to argue that
the judicial system had collapsed or was unavailable, at least for the Dujail
case.
The second element deals with the state's ability to obtain the ac-
cused, the evidence, and the testimony necessary to effectively conduct a
trial. The IHT was clearly able to obtain the accused, as all were in custody
well before the trial.85 The tribunal also obtained the evidence necessary for
the trial; even the Human Rights Watch report and the International Center
for Transitional Justice report do not indicate that the tribunal was unable to
obtain the necessary evidence to conduct its proceedings. The tribunal util-
ized a fairly comprehensive investigatory scheme, staffed by investigators
from allied nations, non-government organizations, and international bod-
ies.86 Similarly, another element highlighted in the ICC Informal Paper and
82 Jeannie Shawl, Former Tribunal Head Says Iraq Wants Show Trial for Saddam, JURIST,
Sept. 23, 2004, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2004/09/fonner-tribunal-
head-says-iraq-wants.php (quoting Salem Chalabi, former head of the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
who accused the Iraqi interim government of wanting "show trials followed by speedy exe-
cutions" for Saddam and his cohorts); John Nichols, A Show Trial and a Show Execution,
THE NATION, Dec. 30, 2006, available at http://www.thenation.com/blogs/notion?bid=15
&pid=152494; Ravi Agrawal, Highlights From the World's Press, CNN, Nov. 6, 2006,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/06/tbr.papers (summarizing
criticism and accounts of the trial and its aftermath published in papers around the world).
83 See Heller, supra note 21.
84 See id.
85 Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, Timeline of Events, in SADDAM ON TRIAL:
UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 76 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory
S. McNeal eds., 2006) (providing dates of Saddam and his co-defendants capture).
86 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, IRAQ'S LEGACY OF TERROR MASS
GRAVES, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/pdf/iraqmassgraves.pdf.
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Darfur Commission Report, irrelevant to the WIT analysis, is the cost to the
international community; the IHT is staffed almost entirely by local experts,
with the international community providing little support to the tribunal.
87
Not so for the final element of the second factor, the ability of the
tribunal to obtain testimony, which was seriously questioned by both Hu-
man Rights Watch and the International Center for Transitional Justice Re-
port.88 Both NGOs stated that the security situation and lack of witness pro-
tection in Baghdad made it difficult to procure witnesses. This inability to
secure witnesses cut both ways, presenting difficulty for the prosecution and
defense. 89 However, unlike the textualist approach, the approach favored by
the ICC Informal Paper or Darfur Commission Report does not indicate that
inability must favor one party-the mere inability to obtain testimony is a
considered element, irrespective of whom it benefits.
In the case of the IHT, it took nearly three years for the court pro-
ceedings to begin.90 The commission report's second conclusion addressed
the speed with which a tribunal could begin proceedings. By international
criminal law standards, a three year turnaround was relatively quick, espe-
cially when compared to the years it took the ICTY and ICTR to begin hear-
912ing cases.91 When analyzed under the commission's approach though,92 this
87 John B. Bellinger, Give a Hand to Justice in Iraq, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 5, 2006,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/05/opinion/edbell.php (stating "the intema-
tional community criticizes the trial from afar but has not found ways to support the Iraqis as
they pursue justice and accountability").
88 See Dujail: Trail & Error, supra note 53, at 10-11.
89 See id. at 14.
90 Michael Moss, Iraq"s Legal System Staggers Beneath the Weight of War, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2006, at Al; see also 2 Co-Defendants Sentenced to Hang for Dujail Killings, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 5, 2006.
91 Gabriel Partos, Analysis: Serbia in the Dock, BBC NEWS, Feb. 27, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/4748960.stm; BBC News, Genocide Suspect Finally
on Trial, BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l1/hi/world/africa/2230784.stm.
92 See Darfur Commission Report, supra note 32, 684 ("The Commission holds the view
that resorting to the ICC would have at least six major merits .... Fifth, the ICC could be
activated immediately, without any delay (which would be the case if one were to establish
ad hoc tribunals or so called mixed or internationalized courts)."); id. 447 ("The trials are
still conducted summarily, as was done by the Special Courts and the death penalty may be
pronounced by the court for a wide-range of offences. According to the decree, an appeal
must be filed within seven days to the head of the judiciary, who delegates the case to mem-
bers of the Court of Appeal. This is a rather short period, considering that court records and
grounds for appeal need to be prepared before completing filing. Also interlocutory decisions
are not subject to any appeal. One cannot but believe that there is an element here to discour-
age convicted persons from appealing against their convictions. Save for sentences of death,
amputations, or life imprisonment, which are heard by a panel of judges, the appeals are
heard by one judge. There is no possibility of further judicial review. In a situation where the




relatively quick turnaround time may still have not prevailed. Any ICC ju-
risdiction determination will not compare a new domestically constituted
tribunal such as the IHT and a new ad hoc tribunal, but rather compare the
new tribunal to the ICC, an existing institution.
The ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Report approach
also include a catchall element, which considers whether a state is "other-
wise unable to carry out proceedings." This ambiguous clause provides six
factors of consideration, three of which are relevant to the IHT proceed-
ings.93
The first factor of the ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission
Report approach assesses facts and evidence that indicate a "lack of neces-
sary personnel, judges, investigators, or prosecutor ... No one has sug-
gested that the IHT lacked the necessary judges, investigators, or prosecu-
tors. However with respect to personnel generally, the International Center
for Transitional Justice Report criticized the IHT for failing to staff key
administrative functions in accordance with the mandate set forth by the
IHT Statute. 95 This lack of personnel, they allege resulted in serious defi-
ciencies in the tribunal's ability to carry out proceedings.
The fourth and fifth factors may apply directly to the case of the
IHT. These factors look to a "lack of access rendering system 'unavailable"
or "obstruction by uncontrolled elements rendering system unavailable;"
both factors may have been exacerbated by the security situation, as was
highlighted above in the discussion and analysis of the tribunal's ability to
obtain the accused, the evidence and the testimony necessary to effectively
conduct a trial.
It is unclear whether a failure to provide fair trial guarantees stand-
ing alone would be enough for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, but the Dar-
fur Commission Report and the ICC Informal Paper certainly suggests the
tribunal should consider this element. As highlighted in Section B.1 above,
the IHT was frequently criticized for failing to meet internationally accepted
fair trial guarantees.96 Such criticisms alleged that the IHT lacked an under-
standing of fair trial principles, and even asserted that a retrial was the only
remedy for the trial's shortcomings.97 The ICC Informal Paper and Darfur
Commission Report approach does not specifically detail criteria for meet-
ing fair trial guarantees. However, the Darfur Commission Report does cite
93 This paper does not address the second factor, dealing with a lack of judicial infrastruc-
ture, the third factor dealing with a lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation, and
the sixth factor dealing with "amnesties or immunities," as the IHT was not criticized with
regard to these elements.
94 INFORMAL PAPER, supra note 17, at 15, 3 1.
95 See Dujail: Trial & Error, supra note 53, at 8, 14.
96 HRW Judging, supra note 58, at 36-37.
97 id.
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to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),98
which is generally considered to establish the minimum standards for a fair
trial. 99
3. The IHT Under Informal Paper and Commission Report Approach
The ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Report approach
is not clear on whether any one element or factor alone is enough to justify
ICC jurisdiction. Such a conclusion seems unlikely, but absent certainty
regarding these provisions, states are left without a clear standard for deter-
mining what good faith efforts on their part will survive an ICC inability
determination. Under the ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Re-
port approach however, a few conclusions are clear about a tribunal such as
the IHT.
Assuming that the NGO criticisms of the IHT were correct, the IHT
would have failed in three major ways. First, the tribunal would have been
deemed unable to obtain the necessary testimony. This inability was attrib-
utable to the violent security situation in Iraq, particularly fear of reprisals
or assassination attempts against witnesses,100 and the lack of a victims and
witness protection program.' 0 1 Related to this is the ability of the tribunal to
ensure that the system is not rendered unavailable due to a lack of access or
obstruction by "uncontrolled elements." The security situation exacerbated
this factor, too, and may contribute to a determination that the IHT was un-
able to conduct its proceedings.
Second, the timeliness of the IHT, despite its relatively quick turn-
around time when benchmarked against previous war crimes trials, may not
have been able to meet the standards of the ICC Informal Paper and Darfur
Commission Report approach. This is a simple fact of permanence; if meas-
ured against the permanent International Criminal Court, a new tribunal
could never establish itself quickly enough to conduct proceedings. More-
over, even assuming that a judicial system in a post-conflict state was fully
operational and capable of beginning proceedings, the specialized nature of
international criminal law would still require training for judges, prosecu-
tors, and court personnel, adding to the time it would take a tribunal to bring
about proceedings. Related to this element, but distinct, is the tribunal's
ability to afford enough personnel, irrespective of their training. The NGO
98 Darfur Commission Report, supra note 32, 454.
" See generally Amnesty Int'l, Fair Trials Manual, at 83-147, Al Index POL
30/002/1998, Dec. 1, 1998, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/POL3000
21998ENGLISHI$File/POL3000298.pdf.





reports criticized the IHT for failing to appropriately staff the IHT in accor-
dance with its statute, a separate issue from the training provided to those
personnel. Taken together, it is possible that the timeliness, personnel train-
ing and personnel staffing issues would have contributed to a determination
that the IHT was unable to proceed.
Third, and perhaps most expansively, the ICC Informal Paper and
Darfur Commission Report approach is migrating toward the due process
thesis. This approach asks whether the tribunal can provide necessary fair
trial guarantees. 10 2 As was highlighted above the IHT was frequently criti-
cized for failing to provide fair trial guarantees. The NGO reports explicitly
relied upon the ICCPR as the standard for fair trial guarantees, a standard
accepted by the ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Report ap-
proach. If the NGO criticism is accepted as accurate, it suggests that a lack
of fair trial guarantees would also contribute to a determination that the IHT
was unable to conduct its proceedings.
In summary, the three major shortcomings identifiable under the
ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Report approach are (1) inabil-
ity to obtain testimony and guarantee access to the tribunal, (2) inability to
quickly begin proceedings (relative to the ICC) with appropriately trained
personnel, and (3) inability to assure fair trial guarantees in accordance with
the ICCPR. While it may be simple to identify shortcomings, the more dif-
ficult question is whether these shortcomings rise to the level necessary to
determine that the tribunal is unable to proceed. The approach applied
herein does not specify whether any one of these factors standing alone
would be sufficient to make an inability determination. To conclude that
any one of these criteria if not satisfied would constitute jurisdiction creates
an absurd situation in which any deficiency, no matter how minor, would
allow ICC jurisdiction. Such an approach would expand the court's jurisdic-
tion beyond even that of the due process theorist approach. For example,
such an approach could mean that a failure to effectively secure testimony
in one instance of witness intimidation might rise to an inability determina-
tion. Clearly the signatories to the ICC Statute did not intend such an expan-
sive and unclear approach. However, to conclude in the alternative that only
some unmet criteria would allow for jurisdiction would require someone to
determine which criteria to select, or to determine the weight one criterion
should receive at the expense of another. The ICC Informal Paper and Dar-
fur Commission Report approach, while providing additional factors of con-
sideration, has done little to provide states with clarity regarding when the
ICC is precluded from exercising jurisdiction. Weighing the factors above,
one group of experts could conclude that the HIT was unable to proceed
while another group could reach the opposite conclusion. The only clear
102 INFORMAL PAPER, supra note 17, at 15-16.
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conclusion is that the ICC Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Report
lacks the clarity necessary for effective determinations.
4. Due Process Theorist Approach
The "due process thesis" asserts that a nation that cannot conduct a
trial meeting international standards of "due process" may fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Under this approach, states must "adhere to stan-
dards of due process found in international human rights instruments, par-
ticularly as they relate to the rights of defendants. 1 °3 Applying this test to
the IHT is far less complicated than applying the ICC Informal Paper and
Darfur Commission Report test. Under this test though, the tribunal almost
certainly would not have retained jurisdiction.
First, the IHT applied the death penalty, regarded by human rights
groups as a violation of international law. 0 4 Furthermore, the IT's proce-
dures appeared to violate the ICCPR. Specifically, "Article 6(4) of the
ICCPR states that 'anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek
pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation
of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases' .. . . The IHT Statute's
prohibition on amnesty or commutation appears to infringe upon the consti-
tutional authority of the president" of Iraq who has the ability to commute
sentences under the Iraqi Constitution, but not under cases decided by the
IHT. 0 5 Second, as highlighted above and throughout the NGO reports,
many claimed that the IHT failed to meet the international standards neces-
sary to provide for a fair trial. Under the due process theorist approach, if
the NGO criticism of the tribunal is accepted as accurate, the IHT would not
have been able to preclude ICC jurisdiction.
103 Heller, supra note 21, at 258 (citing Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court
and Its Implications for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L.
215, 241 (2002)).
104 Iraq: Don't Add Death Penalty to Dujail Sentence, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 12,
2007), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/12/iraq15295.htm (stating that Hu-
man Rights Watch and the ICTJ both consider the death penalty to be an inherently cruel and
inhuman punishment); See also Mike Newton, Should Saddam Hussein Be Exposed to the
Death Penalty?, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL 102 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006); William Schabas,
Should Saddam Hussein Be Exposed to the Death Penalty?, in SADDAM ON TRIAL:
UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 104 (Michael P. Scharf & Greg-
ory S. McNeal eds, 2006); Michael P. Scharf, Should Saddam Hussein Be Exposed to the
Death Penalty?, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL 106 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006) (debating the propriety
of subjecting the defendants to the death penalty).
105 HRW Judging, supra note 58, at 87.
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5. Was the IIHT Unable?
Determining whether the IHT would have been able to conduct pro-
ceedings in a manner precluding ICC jurisdiction turns upon what test the
ICC applies. Under a textualist approach, it is unlikely that the ICC would
exercise jurisdiction over the IHT and its defendants. Despite flaws, those
flaws ran to the advantage of the defendants; though unfortunate, this does
not qualify as shortcoming justifying ICC jurisdiction. Following the ICC
Informal Paper and Darfur Commission Report approach, it is not clear
whether the ICC would exercise jurisdiction, as the approach lacks the clar-
ity necessary for effective determinations. While seemingly objective crite-
ria were set forth in the paper and the report, the method of applying these
criteria, and the authority to do so, leaves open the question as to whether
the IHT would have been deemed unable under the IHT approach. Finally,
under the due process theorist approach, the IHT would likely have been
deemed unable to conduct proceedings in a manner necessary to preclude
ICC jurisdiction. If accepted as accurate, the NGO criticism focused exten-
sively on the inability of the tribunal to provide protections meeting interna-
tional standards of due process,10 6 fair trial guarantees, 0 7 and international
human rights.'
0 8
One clear conclusion cutting across all of the tests is the impact of
the security situation on ability determinations. Under the textualist ap-
proach, an unstable or declining security situation could create a circum-
stance where inability on the part of the tribunal to effectively conduct its
proceeding may have run to the advantage of the defendant. For example, a
defendant could be shielded from justice through attacks on judges, prose-
cutors, and prosecution witnesses. A violent security situation could prevent
the tribunal from effectively gathering evidence necessary to prove their
case, or could result in the tribunal deciding to forgo holding the proceed-
ings and perhaps even releasing defendants. Such potential outcomes of a
violent security situation can all advantage the defendants, and would justify
ICC jurisdiction under the textualist approach. Security also has an impact
under the Informal Paper and Commission Report approach. Fear of repri-
sals or assassination attempts against witnesses or members of the tribunal
staff1 °9 and the lack of a victims and witness protection program both re-
lated to the security situation."0 Moreover a violent security situation im-





109 INFORMAL PAPER, supra note 17, at 30.
110 Saddam Lawyers 'Need Protection', supra note 99.
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
pacts the tribunal's ability to ensure that the system is not rendered unavail-
able due to a lack of access or obstruction by "uncontrolled elements." Fi-
nally, under the due process theorist approach the security situation has a
direct impact on ability determinations, particularly as the security situation
relates to the defendant's ability to effectively defend his case in accordance
with international fair trial guarantees. A violent or declining security situa-
tion could impact the defendants' ability to meet with counsel and mount an
effective case. This was a fact in the Dujail case, when multiple defense
counsel were assassinated or kidnapped. I1 ' The "essential ingredient [for a
fair trial] is the service of zealous defense counsel who can investigate, con-
fer, speak, and work without fear. A regime that cannot guarantee the op-
portunity for defense counsel to perform this way cannot claim to dispense
justice in its courts."'"1 2
Accepting the security factor as a constant, and considering the
other factors detailed in each test one can conclude that the IHT would have
been able to conduct proceedings under a textualist approach, and unable
under a due process theorist approach. Under the Informal Paper and Com-
mission Report approach, it is unclear whether the IHT would have pre-
cluded ICC jurisdiction. However attributing equal weight to each factor,
and accepting the arguments put forth by various human rights groups, it
seems likely that the IHT would have been deemed unable under the Infor-
mal Paper and Commission Report approach.
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
As my colleagues and I point out in Ten Lessons from the Saddam
Trial, the ICC's "complementarity regime" attempts to reflect international
recognition that domestic trials have advantages over international trials and
are to be preferred unless the national courts are unable or unwilling to
prosecute." 13 Despite this fact, "undertaking international war crimes trials
is arduous; in a country plagued by sectarian violence and devoid of reliable
security mechanisms."' 14 To preclude ICC jurisdiction, future domestic tri-
bunals will have to ensure they "guarantee the protection of defense coun-
1 See Michael P. Scharf, The Significance of the Kidnapping/Murder of Defense Counsel,
in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 121 (Mi-
chael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006).
112 See Raymond Brown, The Significance of the Kidnapping/Murder of Defense Counsel,
in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 123, 124
(Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006); See Michael Newton, Should the IHT
Relocate Outside of Iraq?, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI
HIGH TRIBUNAL 126 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006).





sel, as well as the judges, prosecutors and witnesses-whether they desire




Second, the vaguely defined concept of inability and the varied tests
and interpretations all provide support for ICC critics who assert that the
court is seeking expansive jurisdiction, threatening national sovereignty. 16
In its early years the ICC will be cautious, however-because its reach is
largely judge-made-it may expand beyond that contemplated by signato-
ries to the ICC Statute. In particular, the United States is concerned that
the vast majority of the court's discretion lies within the Office of
the Prosecutor, the ICC offers little opportunity to resolve these issues dip-
lomatically and, because of its lack of appropriate checks and balances to
prevent it from being misused, represents a dangerous temptation for those
with political axes to grind. Americans need more reliable protection than
the goodwill and good judgment of an international legal bureaucrat."17
The vagaries of inability determinations only add support to the ar-
guments of critics.
Third, as domestically constituted tribunals proliferate, it is likely
that the textualist theory will prevail in the short term, while the ICC is in its
infancy and concerned about its legitimacy. However as it evolves over
time, the "due process thesis" will be difficult for the court to resist. In fact,
Heller, who provided us the useful textualist theory description, admits that
he favors this approach, as do most scholars, with opinions differing only as
to how this can be achieved. Heller favors modifying the statute through
appropriate diplomatic channels. 18 However, given the difficulty, others
may be comfortable with achieving these goals through judicial fiat. As
Heller points out, "[t]he ICC's judges will find it difficult to resist interven-
ing in national trials that are fundamentally unfair, given their potential to
undermine the legitimacy of international criminal law."'"19
Fourth, the court's expanding jurisdiction will not only prevent crit-
ics from joining the ICC, but may actually hinder the pursuit of justice and
the building of domestic institutions. While an "important ancillary function
of the ICC is to prod national jurisdictions to assume their international le-
gal obligations. Implicitly in the minds of some ... the Court should also
provide technical assistance and capacity-building support to the national
criminal justice systems in their pursuit of investigations and prosecutions
115 Id.
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for international crimes.' 20 This goal is unlikely to be achieved if there is a
perception that very few domestically constituted tribunals can meet the
standards necessary to preclude ICC jurisdiction. In many circumstances,
national jurisdictions may stand back, letting the ICC do the heavy lifting
while international support and capacity-building may never come to the
fore because of a fear that the ICC will pull the carpet out from under sup-
porters before they can complete their work.
The ICC must determine clear-cut criteria for inability determina-
tions, rather than allowing judges and the office of the prosecutor to make
informal determinations about a national jurisdiction's ability to prosecute.
While fair minded jurists may disagree about which of the inability factors
merit the greatest weight, most can concede that two factors are non-
derogable. First, a lack of experienced defense counsel and judges would
make a strong case for an inability determination. Second, the inability of
witnesses and victims to gain access to the court and its proceedings due to
threatened or actual acts of violence undermines the fact seeking determina-
tions of a tribunal. When those security factors rise to a level which pre-
vents the admission of evidence (both inculpatory and exculpatory) the tri-
bunal may be deemed unable.
The task of setting forth clear criteria for inability determinations is
an important one. Doing so will prevent the unintended expansion of ICC
jurisdiction favored by due process theorists. It will contribute to the devel-
opment of domestically constituted tribunals, by encouraging states to seek
local justice. Finally, it will placate the criticism of ICC opponents and may
make it more likely that non-signatories, such as the United States, recon-
sider their opposition to the court.
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